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Available online 14 June 2015AbstractThe lack of well-documented information in the historical literature on the relationship between war-related expectations and their effects on
the bond market in the Ottoman Empire motivates this paper's three contributions. First, this paper is the first empirical study to investigate the
break points in the volatility of Ottoman bond prices from a historical point of view. Second, we use the econometric technique developed by
Inclan and Tiao (1994) to identify the structural breaks. Last, we use a manually collected dataset from the daily newspapers of the time on daily
Ottoman bond prices from 1910 to 1914. Subsequently, we identify five structural break dates, each of them corresponding to important war-
related events. When we investigate the commentaries in the Ottoman newspapers, we see that the outbreak of several wars might not have been
a surprise for investors in the Ottoman Empire, as reflected by government bond prices.
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Recent studies on today's Turkey show that financial markets
have often been affected by the political events (Basdas&Oran,
2014; €Onder & S¸imga-Mugan, 2006; _Ikizlerli & U¨lku¨, 2012).
Specifically, government bond prices are related to fiscal defi-
cits. As the fiscal deficit rises, the value of a government bond
drops and its yield rises due to high default risk; leading to an
increased cost of borrowing for the government. The outbreak
of a war would be interpreted as negative news since it implies
budget deficits, higher interest rates, and higher default risk
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).expectations change the behaviour of investors to avoid losses
or make profits, which leads to structural breaks in the volatility
of bond prices.
Several papers have examined the effects of wars on bond
markets in the US, Europe and China (Brown & Burdekin,
2000; Brown & Burdekin, 2002; Frey & Kucher, 2000,
2001; Ho & Li, 2014; Oosterlinck, 2003; Rigobon & Sack,
2005; Waldenstr€om & Frey, 2008; Willard, Guinnane, &
Rosen, 1996). These studies have focused on the recent Iraq-
US war, the American Civil War and most of all on the Sec-
ond World War. In addition, two papers have investigated
the effects of WWI on European asset prices. Elmendorf,
Hirschfeld, and Weil (1996) found that war news during
WWI affected the variances of returns on British government
bonds. Ferguson (2006) did not identify an important increase
in war risk during the political crises of 1880e1914, which
would have led to substantial change in yields for bonds of
Great Powers1 traded on the London bourse. However, there is1 The UK, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia.
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war-related risks and the bond market in the Ottoman Empire.
Between 1910 and 1914, the Ottoman Empire was involved
in four wars: the Turco-Italian, the First Balkan, the Second
Balkan, and the First World War (WWI), all of which led to
high war expenditures and an increased debt burden of the
Ottoman Empire.2
The Turco-Italian war started on 29 September 1911, as
Italy presented an ultimatum to occupy Libya. During
September 1911, Ottoman newspapers often featured news
related to the desire of Italian nationalists and newspapers to
seize Libya. As the Ottoman state believed that Germany
would have prevented such an attack (Beehler, 1913: p. 16;
Herrmann, 1989: pp. 337e8), the Turco-Italian war caught the
Ottoman government unprepared (Childs, 2008: p. 72; Giolitti,
2012: p. 59). Similarly, Hall (2000: p. 14) maintains that the
Ottoman state considered the outbreak of a war with the
Balkan states to be a low risk. In fact, although Bulgaria was
improving its military capacity prior to the First Balkan war,
the Ottoman state did not recruit soldiers in response (Tanin,
27 September 1912: p. 1). The Second Balkan war officially
broke out on 29 June 1913 with Bulgaria's surprise attack on
Serbia (Erickson, 2001: p. 3). With the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist on 28 June
1914, ongoing tensions related to the former wars increased,
leading to the outbreak of WWI (Henig, 2002: pp. 15e6;
Erickson, 2001: p. 25; Ferguson, 2006). The aim of this paper
is to shed light on the existence of war-related expectations
prior to wars in the Ottoman Empire from 1910 to 1914.
To this end, we estimate structural break points in variances
of government bonds due to the war threats and risks perceived
by bondholders in the Ottoman Empire with a specific focus
on the fluctuations in prices of government bonds traded on the
_Istanbul bourse between 1910 and 1914. We use the econo-
metric method developed by Inclan and Tiao (1994) to identify
the structural breaks in the volatility of bond prices. This
method allows endogeneous selection of break points without
using any prior information. The vast majority of finance
studies use Inclan and Tiao's (1994) test instead of Bai and
Perron's (1998, 2003) method, as financial instability and
hence risk could be identified with breaks in volatility rather
than sudden changes in price series. A review of literature
seems to indicate that, our paper is the first study to use this
methodology in a historical context.
We use daily observations of Treasury and Rumelia Railway
bond prices traded on the _Istanbul bourse from 1910 to 1914.
We collected these data manually from Ottoman newspapers,
which have never been used before to empirically examine the2 The Ottoman Empire joined WWI in November 1914, but we were only
able to extend our sample until July 1914 as there were no available data up to
November 1914.
3 Several studies have used data for the Ottoman government bonds traded
in Europe, such as Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2006) and Tunçer (2009). In
contrast to these researches, using manually collected daily prices from the
Ottoman newspapers, our paper is the first to examine whether threats and
risks due to the wars between 1910 and 1914 were forecasted at the _Istanbul
bourse.war-related information flow into the _Istanbul bourse.3 The
data also allowed us to examine how the _Istanbul bourse
perceived war-related risks. In addition to the methodology
used in the paper, the novelty of this dataset can be regarded as
one of the most important contributions of our paper.
The case we examine is informative for understanding the
reaction of the _Istanbul bourse to the war threats. Our findings
show that bond price variances included break points that coin-
cided with the Turco-Italian and the First Balkan wars. In addi-
tion, prior to the outbreak of these wars, there was a significant
war expectation among the investors at the _Istanbul bourse,
which led to lower bond prices. This is in linewith the arguments
of a commentary in _Ikdam, a widely read newspaper in _Istanbul,
on the negative relationship between war-related news dissem-
ination and the demand of the bondholders for Ottoman gov-
ernment bonds (_Ikdam, 25 September 1911: p. 1). The financial
situation of the Ottoman Empire worsened before the wars
(Geyikdagı, 2011: pp. 119e26), as budget deficits increased due
to war expenditures (Beehler, 1913: p. 82). The results therefore
imply that theOttoman state did not anticipate thesewars that did
not come as a surprise, in contrast to the investors trading at the
_Istanbul bourse who would have lost money.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents the historical background of the _Istanbul
bourse, government bonds, and news dissemination in the
Ottoman Empire. Section 3 and 4 provide information on the
data and model. Section 5 presents the empirical results,
before the conclusions.
2. The _Istanbul bourse, government bonds, and news
After the Crimean War (1853e1856), the financial situation
of the Ottoman Empire worsened. The Ottoman state bor-
rowed from abroad, and a treasury bond, the Konsolid bond,
was issued. The bond was traded over the counter in Galata,
_Istanbul, and also on the Paris and London bourses. Further-
more, investors in the Ottoman Empire invested in shares of
European joint-stock firms before the foundation of a formal
market (Borsa Rehberi-1928, 1990a: pp. 15e6; Kazgan et al.,
1999: pp. 371e75; Fertekligil, 2000: pp. 15, 23).
Over time, many joint-stock companies were founded, and
new government bonds were issued by the Ottoman state. To
regulate thegrowingmarket, a bourse to exchange bonds, stocks,
and foreign currencies was officially established by theOttoman
state in 1866, known as the “_Istanbul Bond Market” (Dersaadet
Tahvilat Borsası). The bourse regulations were copied from the
European bourses (Kazgan, 1995: p. 67; Kazgan et al., 1999: p.
375; Fertekligil, 2000: p. 26; Toprak, 2008: p. 151).
In the 1870s, eight financial assets were traded on the
bourse, including treasury bonds of the Ottoman state and
foreign bonds, e.g., the Bosporus Navigation Company's bond
(S¸irket-i Hayriye). After 1908, Ottoman citizens were
permitted to found joint-stock firms. The number of joint-stock
and limited companies established in the Ottoman Empire
increased from four in 1908 to twenty-four in 1910. Conse-
quently, new domestic bonds and stocks were issued. As of
1914, one hundred and four bonds and stocks were issued by
4 It should be noted that our results may alter if the sample period had
started from another year. Different break points could have been detected
because of periodization. For instance, if the sample period started in 1907,
then we could have identified break points in 1908 as there were several
important political events, e.g., the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by
AustriaeHungary, which could have led to higher volatility in Ottoman bond
prices due to the possibility of the outbreak of a war.
5 We also identify break dates by using Bai and Perron's (1998, 2003)
method. As this is a parametric method, the findings vary due to the
different data distribution assumption and estimation methods, in contrast to
those of the ICSS test. That is the one of the reasons why we prefer using the
ICSS.
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(Kazgan et al., 1999: p. 344; Fertekligil, 2000: pp. 44e5).
Studies on the bond markets of different countries show that
wars signify negative news about the future of governments,
leading to lower government bond prices (e.g., Frey & Kucher,
2000, 2001; Ferguson, 2006; Ho & Li, 2014; Waldenstr€om &
Frey, 2008). Similarly, a commentary in _Ikdamdan Ottoman
newspaperdargued that on 23 September 1911 the prices of
government bonds were negatively affected by news about
Italy's desire to invade Libya. The prices recovered on 24
September after investors believed that this news was
misleading (_Ikdam, 25 September 1911: p. 1). This commentary
shows how quickly war-related news disseminated to investors
in the Ottoman Empire, which affected bond prices.
3. Data
We use the closing price data of the Treasury and the
Rumelia Railway bonds because there is not much information
on the prices of the other government bonds.
It should be noted that the historical literature does not
provide clear information about the turnover and investor
profile on the _Istanbul bourse. According to several sources,
such as Borsa Rehberi-1928 (1990b: p. 337), Kazgan (1995: p.
95) and Fertekligil (2000: p. 82), the Treasury and the Rumelia
Railway bonds were the biggest and the most frequently traded
government bonds on the _Istanbul bourse. The total debts
collected with those bonds were 42,275,772 and 79,200,000
Turkish Liras, respectively. These were the highest figures in
Ottoman foreign debt. With dreams of becoming rich, even
ordinary people living in different parts of the Ottoman Empire
traded at the bourse and bought a large amount of these gov-
ernment bonds. Government officers and members of the
Ottoman dynasty constituted an important fraction of the
bondholders. Non-Muslim citizens of the Ottoman Empire,
bankers, and foreign banks were also important bondholders
due to their links with European finance capitals. In addition,
foreign investors, and even Allied soldiers during the occupa-
tion years had already invested in these bonds (Kazgan, 1995:
pp. 95, 106; Kazgan et al., 1999: pp. 375, 406; Fertekligil,
2000: pp. 82, 89e90, 102e3). Moreover, the Rumelia Rail-
way bond was called the Turkish Lottery bond, as it included
lottery prizes to attract small investors (€Ozyu¨ksel, 2014: p. 16).
The bond price data come from available volumes of Ter-
cu¨man-ı Hakikat and Tanin. The major source is Tercu¨man-ı
Hakikat, which had many available issues. By the end of the
nineteenth century, Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat was a widely circu-
lated daily Ottoman newspaper in _Istanbul, according to
Karpat (2002: pp. 269e70). We used Tanin as an alternative
source when several issues of Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat could not be
found. In addition, bond prices were not reported in some is-
sues. Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat, the first issue of which was pub-
lished in 1878, was an opposition newspaper. Tanin was
established as a pro-government newspaper; however, after
1911 it criticized the Ottoman government harshly and was
closed down. Those newspapers had a column on the opening
and closing prices of several bonds. The National Library ofTurkey and the Beyazıt State Library provide digital copies of
these newspapers. From these sources, we manually extracted
data that have not been used before. In the newspapers, bond
prices were only reported for the period between 2 November
1910 and 31 July 1914.4
The Treasury bond was a consolidated bond that replaced
the earlier bonds except the Rumelia Railway bond. 1,488,126
consolidated bonds, which had a face value of 22 Ottoman
Liras, were issued on 1 September and 14 September 1908.
The rate of interest on the Treasury bond was 4 percent
(Yeniay, 1964: pp. 90e1; Borsa Rehberi-1928, 1990a: p. 153,
1990b: p. 100). There is no detailed information on the
maturity date of the bond, as similar bonds issued in these
years were to be repaid between 50 and 100 years (Yeniay,
1964). In the data sources, the bond price is denominated in
Kurus‚es. The bond could also be bought in British Pounds or
French Francs (Yeniay, 1964: p. 91).
The Rumelia Railway bond was issued by the Ottoman
state to fund railroad building in the European part of the
Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state would have paid money
in French Francs to the railroad building company of Baron de
Hirsch. This probably explains why the face value of this bond
was 400 French Francs. 1,980,000 bonds with a 104-year
maturity were offered to the public on 10 March 1870 and 12
September 1872. The yield of these Rumelia Railway bonds
was 3 percent (Yeniay, 1964: pp. 43e4; Borsa Rehberi-1928,
1990b: pp. 83e6; Akyıldız, 2001: p. 106). The Rumelia
Railway bond is denominated in French Francs in the data
sources. Because the exchange rates were constant over the
sample period, we do not need to convert the price of the
Rumelia Railway bond into Kurus‚es.
4. Methodology
We identify the break points in the volatility of the Ottoman
government bond prices by using an Iterative Cumulative Sums
of Squares (ICSS) algorithm as proposed by Inclan and Tiao
(1994). Recently, Waldenstr€om and Frey (2008) used Bai and
Perron's (1998, 2003) method to examine the effects of war-
related risks in Nordic countries during the Second World War,
identifying breaks in bond yields. Inclan and Tiao (1994) suggest
that the sudden change invariance or volatility is a bettermeasure
of risk perceived by bondholders rather than breaks in bond pri-
ces. So, ICSS is superior toBai andPerron's (1998, 2003)method.
ICSS is a nonparametric method5 and endogenously de-
termines the break points by using squared price changes,
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tion of series and the timing and existence of breaks. More-
over, ICSS does not require an exogenous selection for the
maximum number of break points, in contrast to Bai and
Perron's (1998, 2003) method.
ICSS assumes that a time series of interest has a variance
interrupted by an unknown number of sudden changes. To
estimate both the number and the time point of changes in
variance, ICSS uses the centred (and normalized) cumulative
sum of squares statistic defined as:
Dk ¼ðCk=þCTÞðk=TÞ k¼ 1;…;T with D0¼Dk ¼ 0 ð1Þ
where T is the number of observations. Ck ¼
Pk
t¼1ε
2
t denotes
the cumulative sum of squared observations from start of the
series until the kth point in time.
The plot of the Dk statistic against k oscillates around zero
for the observations having homogenous variance with no
sudden changes. As a sudden change takes place in variance,
the plot of Dk exhibits a pattern going out of some specified
boundaries with high probability. ICSS is based on detecting
maximum deviation from these boundaries. If the maximum
value of jDkj is greater than the critical value, the null hy-
pothesis of no change can be rejected.
Prices of government bonds may not be stationary, which
may lead to biased test statistics. To this end, we use returns of
government bonds, which are estimated by the following
formula:
Rt ¼ lnðPt=Pt1Þ ð2Þ
where Pt is daily price of the bond in time t.
5. Results5.1. Descriptive results6 In finance literature, the GARCH model is used to check whether break
dates have a significant effect on volatility, and hence on financial market
instability. To check the robustness of our findings, we use the GARCH (1, 1)
model. The findings show that break dates identified by the ICSS test have
statistically significant effects on volatility series. In other words, break dates,
or events behind the volatility changes, were important in terms of causing
financial instability in the _Istanbul Bourse.
7 See also Kologlu (1999) for the detailed discussion on campaigns in Italy
for invading Libya.Fig. 1 presents the daily closing prices of the Treasury and
Rumelia Railway bonds as well as the starts of wars. The paths
of two bond prices are similar. This is not surprising as they
can bear the same default risk. On the other hand, the Rumelia
Railway bond was much more volatile than the Treasury bond.
This could be attributed to the fact that railroads were located
in a war zone during the Balkan wars.
In the long run, there is a slight decrease in bond prices,
which is particularly marked during the outbreak of the First
Balkan war and the end of the Turco-Italian wars in October
1912. We observe a strong decrease in the Rumelia Railway
bond prices compared to those of the Treasury bond. As the
Second Balkan war starts in June 1912, there is a slight reduc-
tion in prices. Bond prices recovered before the war ended in
August 1913. These reductions during war times imply a posi-
tive correlation between default risk of bonds and wars.
Bond prices fell prior to the outbreak of the Turco-Italian
war. Prices strongly recovered just after the outbreak of the
war. Similarly, Fig. 1 indicates a decrease in the prices
particularly before the outbreak of the First and Second Bal-
kan wars. Furthermore, a fall in bond prices is observed priorto the beginning of WWI. These observations indicate an
increasing war risk perceived by investors at the _Istanbul
bourse before the wars.5.2. Identification of break timesTable 1 gives the break points for volatility of Treasury and
Rumelia Railway bond prices.6 The basis points in column (3)
reflect that the magnitude of change in the average bond prices
observed after and before the break points. This exercise al-
lows us to examine different effects of war-related events. For
instance, the beginning of the Turco-Italian war might have led
to a decrease in prices. When a peace treaty between the
Ottoman Empire and Italy ended the war, there would be an
increase in prices. In both cases, volatility would be high due
to capital outflows and inflows. Fig. 2 shows variances for
returns of the bonds and corresponding break dates. This in-
formation allows us to examine the changes and magnitude of
risk perceptions in war-related events that lead to structural
breaks.
Column (2) of Table 1 reports the five break points detec-
ted. The breaks in return variances of the Treasury bond are at
the same times as those in the Rumelia Railway bond. It seems
that the default risks of the two bonds are similar because both
were issued by the Ottoman state.
The first break is identified on 21 September 1911. This
break point corresponds to eight days before the official start
of the Turco-Italian war. The break caused a reduction in the
prices of Treasury and Rumelia Railway bonds by 6.38 and
17.13 basis points, respectively.
Before the outbreak of the war, different editions of Tanin
and Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat reported that the Italian government,
press, and diplomats began a lobbying campaign to invade
Libya (Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat, 12 September 1911: p. 1;
Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat, 18 September 1911: p. 1; Tanin, 12
September 1911: p. 1; Tanin, 19 September 1911: p. 1;
Hu¨seyin Cahid, 22 September 1911: p. 1). There had been
increasing tension between the Ottoman Empire and Italy
since 1905, as Italy desired to control Libya and the Aegean
Islands. To this end, even the conversion of an Italian girl to
Islam in Athens could turn into an important political problem
(Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat, 11 September 1911: p. 1).7 Around mid-
September, news and commentary related to the tensions be-
tween the Ottoman Empire and Italy regarding Libya appeared
more often. For instance, there were only several news or
pieces of commentary in Tanin or Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat be-
tween 13 and 31 August, as around twenty news or com-
mentaries were published between 1 and 20 September.
Table 1
Structural break points in variance for returns of Treasury and Rumelia railway
bonds (1910e14).
Bonds Break dates Basis points
Treasury bond 21.09.1911
29.09.1911
17.11.1911
29.02.1912
29.09.1912
6.38
6.19
5.50
5.85
9.42
Rumelia Railway bond 21.09.1911
29.09.1911
17.11.1911
29.02.1912
29.09.1912
17.13
16.44
13.63
12.20
13.05
Note: Table shows the break dates selected by the Inclant-Tiao (1994) test. In
column (3), basis points represent the difference between average bond price
after and before the break.
Fig. 1. Prices for Treasury and Rumelia Railway Bonds 1910e14. Note: The price of the Treasury bond is denominated in Kurus‚es while the price of the Rumelia
Railway bond is denominated in French Francs. Data source: Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat and Tanin, 1910e1914.
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September, indicating higher uncertainty and risk as perceived
by investors at the _Istanbul bourse prior to the Turco-Italian
war, which led to a decrease in bond prices.
We observe another break point on 29 September 1911, the
official start of the Turco-Italian war. On 28 September, Italy
officially declared its desire to occupy Libya. The Ottoman
state rejected this claim, issuing another ultimatum. Italy
declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 29 September at 3
p.m. (Tanin, 30 September 1911: p. 1; Beehler, 1913: p. 16).
The actual outbreak of the war on 29 September did not
affect bond prices at the same day, as the bourse was open
between 9.30 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. (Borsa Rehberi-1928, 1990a:
p. 141). The probability of war was capitalised by investors in
the Ottoman Empire until 29 September, which led to a
decrease in bond prices due to higher uncertainty on the
Fig. 2. Variance in returns of Treasury and Rumelia Railway bonds. Notes: Variances are obtained through moving windowed variance formula with the window
length of 5 and 10 days, respectively.
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newspapers as well. Between 22 and 29 September, around
fifty news stories and pieces of commentary in Tanin or Ter-
cu¨man-ı Hakikat covered increasing tensions between the
Ottoman Empire and Italy.
Interestingly, the decline in bond prices did not differ much
from those in the first break point, and they were small in
magnitude (6.19 and 16.44, respectively). It seems that
investors had already sold the bonds prior to 29 September. In
Fig. 2, variance on 29 September is larger than that observed
before. It shows that the possibility for the outbreak of the war
had led to higher default risk perceptions.
As shown in Fig. 1 and 2, bond prices gradually recovered
and variances decreased after 29 September, reflecting thatinvestors trading at the _Istanbul bourse did not expect a long
war that would have caused higher budget deficits and default
risk. This is because Italy successfully seized Tripoli in just a
few days (Beehler, 1913: p. 20). As discussed by the owner
and head columnist of Tanin, Hu¨seyin Cahid (Tanin, 6 October
1911: p. 1), the defeat of the Ottoman Empire caused great
disappointment among the Ottomans.
The third break is identified on 17 November 1911, one and
a half months after the outbreak of the Turco-Italian war.
There were 5.50 and 13.63 basis point reductions in the bonds'
prices. Fig. 2 indicates an increase in variances. In particular,
the variance of return for the Rumelia Railway bond was quite
high on 17 November. On 16 November, Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat
reported that a huge number of Ottoman soldiers were ready to
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argued that the war would become more severe day by day
(Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat, 16 November 1911: p. 1).
Another break takes place on 29 February 1912, leading to
a reduction in bond prices of Treasury and Rumelia Railway
bonds by 5.86 and 12.2 basis points, respectively. Fig. 2 in-
dicates that variances started to increase after 29 February
1912. Commentary in the newspapers reported that the Otto-
mans were furious at to the Italian attack on Beirut, and the
Ottoman state decided to expel Italians residing in Syria after
28 September (Tercu¨man-ı Hakikat, 26 February 1912: p. 1;
Beehler, 1913: p. 58). It seems that these events sent a message
to investors about the scale and severity of the war. Further-
more, it brought increased uncertainty, risk and serious dam-
age to the Ottoman economy.
We observe the final break point on 29 September 1912,
before the outbreak of the First Balkan war and the end of the
Turco-Italian war. There was a decrease in bond prices by 9.42
and 13.05 basis points. Reduction in bond prices again
increased in magnitude on this day. In addition, after 29
September, variances began to rise, and there was a peak on 16
October, as shown in Fig. 2. This shows a larger uncertainty in
comparison to those in the other points. Moreover, Fig. 1 in-
dicates a downturn in bond prices that hadn't recovered. This
higher uncertainty can be attributed to the current war as well
as the expectation of a new war.
The break on 29 September 1912 might be related to the
prediction of the outbreak of the First Balkan war by investors
in the Ottoman Empire. On 27 September, a political and
military alliance was signed among the Balkan states against
the Ottoman Empire (Beehler, 1913; p. 13). Even one year
before, i.e., on 28 September 1911, Tanin underlined a
possible conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Greece in
the near future due to negotiations between Greece and other
Balkan states for an alliance (Tanin, 28 September 1911: p. 1).
On 27 September 1912, a commentary reported that Bulgaria
had begun recruiting reserve force soldiers, which led to an
expectation that Bulgaria would soon declare war against the
Ottoman Empire (Tanin, 27 September 1912: p. 1).
Additionally, on 28 September, a commentary in Tanin re-
ported that an Italian fleet sailed into the Gulf of Izmir,
delaying peace negotiations that had been launched by the
Great Powers in March 1912 (Tanin, 28 September 1912: p. 1).
As expected, peace negotiations were delayed in October
(Beehler, 1913: p. 95). Subsequently, the Ottoman state
imposed additional taxes to fund its war expenditures (Beehler,
1913: p. 82). It seems that investors trading at the _Istanbul
bourse had predicted that the Turco-Italian war would not end
quickly and that the Ottoman state would be in financial
trouble. Hence, our findings indicate higher perceived uncer-
tainty and default risk after the breakdown of peace talks.
6. Conclusions
Financial markets are highly sensitive to news dissemina-
tion. This idea is based on the fact that investors take positions
in case of important news to avoid losses in bond markets.News such as wars can lead to price changes through capital
outflows and changes in investment strategies. Hence, an
investigation of sudden price changes reveals information
about the timeline of reactions leading to structural changes.
Based on the historical data for the prices of Ottoman
government bonds, we argue that large fluctuations in bond
prices can provide information on how bondholders in the
Ottoman Empire reacted to unanticipated events.
Our empirical findings identify five break points that cor-
responded to events about the Turco-Italian war and the First
Balkan war. Bond prices began to fall considerably on 21
September 1911 as there was a significant increase in vari-
ances. The break point occurred one week before the war
between the Ottoman Empire and Italy started. The bond price
experienced another large fall on 29 September 1911 when the
war began. There were two other break points observed on 17
November 1911 and 29 February 1912 related to events in the
Turco-Italian war. Another break is identified on 29 September
1912, just before the end of the Turco-Italian war and prior to
the outbreak of the First Balkan war.
News and commentary in the Ottoman newspapers often
included negative messages, reflecting that war would be
possible in the near future. For investors, that meant higher
default risk, which led to lower prices for government bonds
due to capital outflows, as volatility increased. During wars in
our sample, the Ottoman Empire experienced an increasing
debt burden due to military expenditures. The Ottoman state
began to borrow at high rates during these times. The interest
rate for long-term borrowing increased from 4 percent in 1911
to 5 percent in 1914 (Kıray, 1995: pp. 213e21). These rate
increases indicate why bondholders at the _Istanbul bourse
considered war as a source of risk, reflected by decreasing
prices. Accordingly, it can be argued that the _Istanbul bourse
was sensitive to the political crises of 1910e1914, in contrast
to Ferguson's (2006) study on the London bourse. This could
be related to the fact that the political crises heralded the onset
of WWI, the decline of the Ottoman Empire, and many eco-
nomic problems such as inflation, and a decrease in trade and
production. It seems that the price changes on the _Istanbul
bourse were informative for the Ottoman politicians, whom
the war caught unaware, allowing them to successfully antic-
ipate the economic results of war.
This paper could lead to further research if detailed data on
the number of bonds in circulation, volume of trade, and
investor profiles in the Ottoman Empire were to be found, as
this information would help to characterize the _Istanbul bourse.
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